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Vo1,. XVI. NOVEMBER, 1917 
WAR AND LAW.* 
No. l. 
L AW creates rights. It not merely defines them; it creates them. Without law, one may what he can. With law, one can only 
that which he may. Law is the device by which the many, 
individually weak, control and compel the few individually strong 
or cunning. It is a device by which is reduced nature's handicap in 
favor of the physically strong and ruthless. Where law obtains, 
those who are fitted to the system created by the law, as the eco-
nomically efficient, prevail and survive. In the absence of law, only 
the strong and cunning can survive. 
War is the logical expression of physical force. It is the negation 
of peace between nations, as law is the assertion of peace between 
individuals. International law, to be sure, theoretically contemplates 
and provides for war within the law; but the present struggle per-
suades that this is hardly more than sterile theory. 
A gathering of lawyers, intent upon the science of their calling at 
a time when nearly all the so-called civilized world is at war, is, 
therefore, an anomaly, unless the prevalence of war prompts them 
again to search for and test the foundations of their science. 
Only because international law is primitive and in it, therefore, 
we may discover perhaps more easily than in the more complex and 
finished product of municipal law some of the fundamental concepts· 
of jurisprudence, and not at all because I have any peculiar learning 
in that branch of our science, I wish to call to your attention some 
modern views as to what are the fundamental concepts of inter-
national law. For this purpose, I shall contrast an American view, 
as expressed in the Declaration of Rights and Duties of Nations, 
adopted by the American Institute of International La_w; a French 
view, as expressed by Antoine Fillet, a member of the faculty of law 
•An address delivered before the Minnesota State Bar Association on August 9, 1917. 
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in the University of Paris, and a German view, as expressed by Dr. 
Joseph Kohler, Privy Councillor and Professor in the University of 
Berlin. After these I shall be so bold as to suggest a theory, in 
part, at least, my own. 
The American Institute of International Law consists of five del-
egates chosen by the Societies of International Law of each of the 
twenty-one republics in the Western Hemisphere. it is not official, 
but exists with the approval of each of the governments. At the 
first meeting of the Institute, held in Washington, beginning on De-
cember 29, 1915, there was adopted the Deelaration of Rights and 
Duties of Nations, as follows: 
"WHEREAS, The municipal law of civilized nations recognizes and 
protects the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to the pursuit 
of happiness, as added by the Declaration of Independence of the 
United States of America, the right to legal equality, the right to 
property, and the right to the enjoyment of the aforesaid rights; and 
"WHEREAS, These fundamental rights, thus universally recog-
nized, create a duty on the part of the peoples of all nations to ob-
serve them; and 
"WHEREAS, According to the political philosophy of the Declara-
tion of Independence of the United States, and· the universal prac-
tice of the American Republics, nations or governments are regarded 
as created by the people, deriving their just powers from the consent 
of the governed, and are instituted among men to promote their 
safety and happiness and to secure to the people the enjoyment of 
their fundamental rights; and 
"WHEREAS, The nation is a moral or juristic person, the creature 
of law, and subordinated to law as is the natural person in political 
society ; and 
"WHEREAS, We deem that these fundamental rights can be stated 
in terms of international law and applied to the relations of the 
members of the society of nations, one with another, just as they 
have been applied in the relations of the citizens or subjects of the 
states forming the Society of Nations; and 
"WHEREAS, These fundamental rights of national jurisprudence, 
namely, the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to the pursuit 
of happiness, the right to equality before the law, the right to prop-
erty, and the right to the observance thereof are, when stated in 
terms of international law, the right of the nation to exist and to 
protect and to conserve its existence; the right of independence and 
the freedom to develop itself without interference or control from 
other nat!ons; the right of equality in law and before law; the right · 
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to territory within defined boundaries and to exclusive jurisdiction 
therein; and the right to the observance of these fundamental rights; 
and 
"WHEREAS, The rights and the duties of nations are, by virtue of 
:m,embership in the society thereof, to be exercised and performed in 
accordance with the exigencies of their mutual interdependence ex-
pressed in the preamble to the Convention for the Pacific Settle-
ment of International Disputes of the First and Second Hague 
Peace Conferences, recognizing the solidarity which unites the mem-
bers of the society of civilized nations; 
"Therefore, The American Institute of International Law, at its 
first session, held in the City of Washington, in the United States 
of America, on the sixth day of January, 1916, adopts the following 
six articles, together with the commentary thereon, to be known as 
its Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations: 
"I. Every nation has the right to exist, and to protect and to 
conserve its existence; but this right neither implies the right nor 
justifies the act of the state to protect itself or to conserve its exist-
ence by the commission of unlawful acts against innocent and un-
offending states. 
"II. Every nation has the right to independence in the sense 
that it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is free to develop 
itself without interference or control from other states, provided 
that in so doing it does not interfere with or violate the rights of 
other states. 
"III. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of every 
other nation belonging to the society of nations, and all nations have 
the right to claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence 
of the United States, 'to assume, among the powers of the earth, 
the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of 
nature's God entitle them.' 
"IV. Every nation has the right to territory within defined 
boundaries and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its territory, 
and all persons whether native or foreign found therein. 
"V. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations is 
entitled to have that right respected and protected by all other na-
tions, for right and duty are correlative, and the right of one is the 
duty of all to observe. 
"VI. International law is at one and the same time both national 
and international; national in the sense that it is the law of the land 
and applicable as such to the decision of all questions involving its 
principles ; international in the sense that it is the law of the society 
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-of nations and applicable as such to· all questions between and among 
the members of the society of nations ·involving its principles."1 
In this announcement there is nol\e of the hesitancy of over-re-
finement; but, if it lacks in scientific nicety, jt is youthful, buoyant 
and hopeful. It has in it the same ring of noble purpose which 
stirs our hearts when we read the Declaration of Independence. 
The captious may cavil and challenge the authors to state whence 
they derive these ideas of nation~l rights. The historical scholar 
may point out the many fallacies into which writers have fallen by 
pressing too close the analogy between a nation and an individual, 
and argue that ·these declarants have not escaped that pitfall, but 
despite all scientific criticism, mankind will read this declaration as 
we, for _the past one hundred and forty years, have read the Declara-
tion of Independence, and feel in their hearts a noble aspiration 
toward world-unity, sympathy and justice. It is the challenge 
thrown to the world by Democracy-self-respecting and regardful 
of others' rights, courageous and generous. It is not only a chal-
lenge-it is an invitation to the rest of the world to join in a peace-
ful and well-ordered international life. The democracies of the 
American continent are horrified by war, but they stand undismayed 
and unafraid. 
In an article published in the June number of the Yale Law J our-
nal, entitled "Some Observations on the Private International Law 
of the Future," translated by Dr. Ernest G. Lorenzen, Professor of 
Law in the University of Minnesota, Antoine Fillet, a distinguished 
professor in the University of Paris, treats of two questions or pri-
vate international law-the status of aliens and the conflict of laws. 
The two questions treated are perhaps foreign to our present in-
quiry, but expressions of the learned author, as he develops his sub-
ject, make vivid to our understanding, in contrast with the American 
point of view, the despairing attitude of the French scholar. He 
says: 
''I regard it as certain that the end of the war will bring about a 
noticeable rapprochement 'between certain nations which have re-
mained; heretofore, very distant toward each other. Is it necessary 
for me to indicate here that I do not mean to allude to any plan 
whatsoever for the reconstruction of society on a rational basis? 
The persons who do me the honor of reading these lines well know 
that I regard all projects of this sort as so many idle fancies which 
cannot be realized. The contemporaneous events since and inclusive 
of The Hague Conferences, have only confirmed these views. * * * 
1 X Am. Jour. ·of Int. !;aw, 124. 
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Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the period in which the 
first of the new doctrines of Private International Law came to· 
light, their development has been in the direction of an almost un-
limited cosmopolitanism. L was assumed that the mission of this 
science was not only to aid in the good administration of private 
justice among the nations, but that it should lower also, by degrees, 
the barriers separating subjects from aliens, so as to make of all 
inhabitants of the civilized countries one people, with a view to sub-
jecting them gradually to the same institutions. Hence, the tend-
ency to favor changes of nationality; hence the avowed determina-
tion to suppress all differences in the civil status of aliens and sub-
jects; hence, also, the growing frequency of those great conventions 
which aim to establish, to an appreciable extent, uniformity of legis-
lation. 
"We believed that progress was to be found in that direction. We 
all shared, more or less, this mistake, and I am well aware that there 
are pages in my writings to which I would no longer subscribe. One 
painful experience has undeceived us. We committed the two-fold 
mistake of thinking that the juridical consequences attached to the 
idea of .nationality could be weakened without danger and of failing 
to see that the same regime of law does not equally suit all nations. 
We now know that a people grows stronger by birth and not by nat-
uralization. Equality between subjects and aliens is with us no 
longer a dogma. The great conventions have not justified the high 
hopes reposed in them. The spirit of cosmopolitanism is therefore 
dead. Warned by experience, the people will be resolutely nation-
alists. They will live by themselves knowing that by seeking too 
much foreign collaboration they incur the nsk of ending in servi-
tude." 
Later, in discussing the embarrassments of the tribunal called on 
to decide a question of a conflict of laws, he says : 
"And this (difficulty) will remain so as long as the international 
society, which has been promised to us so often, has not been organ-
ized; and it will never be organized."2 
These are the expressions of a man who has witnessed the war 
not from afar, but whose ears have been deafened by the thunder 
of the enemy's guns at the gates of his own beloved city. To the 
Frenchman, however scholarly he may be, however valiantly he 
may struggle to preserve his scientific objectivity, a theory of inter-
national society that contemplates close co-operation between France 
and Germany is abhorrent. His scholarship may avail to resist the 
2 XXVI Yale Law Jour. 631, 633, 638. 
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temptation to revile the enemy, but his soul cries out-"the spirit 
of cosmopolitanism is dead". 
In Ig09, only five years before the war broke out, Dr. Joseph 
Kohler, Professor in the University of Berlin and a Privy Council-
lor, published the great work which has been translated as Volume 
I2 of the Modem Legal Philosophy Series, under the title of, "The 
Philosophy of Law". Speaking of the distinguished author, Dr. 
Roscoe Pound has referred to him as "the first of living jurists," 
adding: , 
"No orte else has come so heat to taking all legal knowledge for 
his province. No one, therefore, is so well prepared to reduce all 
legal knowledge to a system."3 
The fast book of this work treats of international law with a 
vision so clear artd a scholarship so profound that one reading it 
would surely think its author would, in all events, preserve his sci-
erttific attitude, observe phenomena dispassionately and bring to 
bear upon the observed phenomena the cold, clear light of reason. 
Contrast, then, with what was to be expected, an article written by 
this same author and published in September, I9I5, in the "Zeitz-
schrift Fiir Volkerrecht". A translation by J. S. Reeves, a profes-
sor in the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts of the Uni-
versity of Michigan, under the title, "The New La'v of NatiC?ns," 
appeared in the June number of this year of the MICHIGAN LA w 
R:svn:w. After commenting upon the efforts made during the pre-
ceding centttry, especially by the Hague '.Peace Conferences, to en-
rich international law by treaties artd to organize to some degree the 
international community, Dr. Kohler says : 
"This phantasmagoria of a family of nations which would dictate 
the norms of International Law and by judicial methods decide in-
ternational disputes, so that only exceptionally and here and there 
.the structure of the international community would be convulsed by 
war-all that is far behind us. Twelve months only have passed, 
but they divide us from all that has gone before as if years had 
intervened. The occurrences of the past year have accomplished. 
more than decades. The Hague Peace Conferences were dreams 
of peace which have burst like bubbles and the Peace Palace at the 
Hague can appropriately open its halls for other praiseworthy aims 
of mankind. • 
"We also were enthralled by these illusions, and we are frank 
enough to confess, if we are rebuked for being unpractical and short-
s The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, xss, quoted in editorial pre-
face to the Philosophy of Law-XV-XVI. 
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sighted for doing so, t,hat it was our honorablf! German nature 
which permitted us to overlook cunning and weakness; it was our 
belief in mankind which led us and the thought that at least a spark 
of our German idealism was to be found among other peoples. We 
fully believed that we had to do w1th civiliz~d peoples, who, like us, 
were constantly striving to solve the greatest problems of humanity. 
We assumed that every nation had its o, ... n task in the furtherance 
of culture. We believed that the world was big enough so that all 
nations in furthering their own interests would by straight-forward 
intercourse increase the spiritual assets of the entire world. This 
illusion was a huge deception of race psychology, but it was the de-
ception of i:. man of bonor who falls into the gnp cf a cunning 
band; such an error honors him who errs, and loyalty to a mistaken 
morality raises him who is thus deceived giant-high above the reptile 
which crawls about him. 
"Then we became clear-visioned. The German Siegfried, who 
has never learned to know fear, is awakened at the right moment. 
Just as Siegfried once understood the speech of birds, so now we 
recognize in the buzzing and tumult of the world-strife the true soul 
of our opponents, and the dragon of cunning, lies, and slander is 
stretched beneath our victorious sword. The noble myth of our 
people has become a reality. 
"An International Law based on international treaties can no 
longer be. International association can only lead to norms of law 
if the peoples are actuated by legal endeavors. Treaties with liars 
and falsifiers cannot form sources of law; only those peoples can 
co-operate in the development of law who have a living conscience. 
Shall we recognize as brother nations having kindred conceptions of 
justice those like the French-a nation of bragging tricksters, who 
drench us with most miserable abuse and outrageous slander-or a 
perfidious company of peddlers, like the English, who from the first 
day of the war have flooded the world with statements which they 
knew to be calumnies and lies-a nation whose government did not 
hesitate, like bandits following the fashion of Caesar Borgia, to un-
dertake sneaking bribery in order to get rid of a Roger Casement? 
Or a nation of barbarians, like the Russians, whose excesses in East 
Prussia have suddenly brought before our eyes the whole Muscovite 
brutality? Or the Italians, among whom a miserable lottery-playing 
group made up of the immature and half-educated proletariat, and 
of phrase-drunken demagogues, could bring the government to vio-
late sacred treaties, and to fall upon the flank of their sworn allies? 
No, and thrice, No! These ties are forever broken. And as for 
neutrals, the United States, glorying in an empty play of moral plat-
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itudes with the blessing of the Vanderbilt-Morgan millions, has 
done enough injury to us with its munitions policy. Neutral states 
like Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden will always appear to us dear 
and worthy. On the other hand, a portion of the press of Holland, 
Norway, and Denmark l).as wounded us sorely by its unjust treat-
m~nt of us. , And Holland has perimaded herself, by putting her 
trade under English control to further England's war of starvation! 
In all these circumstances these peoples can never be bound with us 
into an Areopagus wherein every state works with even justice in 
·order to lay down for the world the statutes of the Law of Na-
tions."4 
With ¢is learned and scientific introduction, this German scholar 
proceeds, if I understand his thought, ambushed as it is in clouded 
sentences, to develop the thesis that international law is to be de-
rived by a process of induction applied in the light of the law of 
evolution to observed international phenomena. And he boldly 
maintains that only the trained, scientific minds of Germans can 
suffice; that only in Germany can be found those of adequate scien-
tific attainments to make true observations or draw correct conclu-
sions. From this it would seem to follow that the rest of the woild 
is bound to await the announcements of German scholars for the 
rules of international law. His modest reason for this astounding 
position is the superior scientific attainments of the Germans, but 
the practical result is, of course, that Germany is to make and de-
clare the rules which shall govern all inter-state relations. There 
remains only one step and that this exalted scholar fears not to take. 
If Gentlan sch9lars are to announce rules of international law with-
oµt the help of other European or American jurists and without the 
consent of other nations, obviously there will be required means to 
enforce the rules so declared. But this consideration has no terrors 
for this German sage, for, as he fears not to say, "This is German 
science, for German science alone has been able to work in system-
atic fashion," so he fears not also to say, "The claim is often made 
that thete is no International 1,aw because it is trampled under foot 
by our enemies. This is as erroneous as it would be to assert that 
the:re is no municipal law because at the present time one might be 
liable to be robbed by the banditti of the Italian Abruzzi, or as-
saulted by the Parisian apaches, or by the Milanese rabble. Nat-
urally, International Law needs its sanction just as every branch 
of law does, but we shall, as I hope, be so vastly fortified by our 
victorious war that we can undertake the protection of International 
'XV Mich. Law Rev. 631, 635-6. · 
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Law just as centuries ago the Lombard Dante invoked the German 
Emperor as the protector of law and the shield of justice."5 
These are not the ravings of a defeated military chieftain, they are 
not the outpourings of an over-emotionalized actor nor the hysteri-
ca1 outcry of a grief-stricken mother, but the solemn, scientific, pre-
cise statements of a learned German scholar in a scientific journal 
of world-wide reputation. Consider how profound must be the 
influence of war which can jolt a philosopher into the utterance of 
such grotesquenes. Nearly three hundred years earlier, Hugo Gro-
tius, the father of international law, maintained that "certain laws, 
of which fidelity to plighted word is the most important, are there-
fore as immutable as human nature,"6 but this modern German pro-
fessor of international law boasts of the honorable nature and ideal-
ism of a nation which calls a solemn treaty a scrap of pq.per. No 
wonder he says that international law based on internatiGmal treaties 
can no longer be and that treaties with liars and falsifiers cannot 
form sources of law. If he remembers that t.he German chancellor 
expressed surprise that England should ente1· the war, although five 
days before England did so the directors of the North German-
Lloyd Steamship company wired thP. master of one of their vessels 
that Germany was already at war with England, no wonder he calls 
the English perfidious !1 And who but a German student of inter~ 
national law could be shocked by Muscovite brutality while shutting 
his ears to the cries of murdered women and children in Belgium 
and turning his prophetic eyes from the four hundred thousanci 
refugees ,,.ho have since died by a roadside in Poland, their wasted 
flesh a food for crows, their stripped bones g<:tihered for fertilizer 
by their thrifty, ghoulish conquerors ?8 No wonder the moral plat-
itudes of America plague his con.science. To what apologist for 
murder has any expression of morality ever sounded as ought but 
platitude? If such an abdication of the throne of reason does not 
persuade us that Cardinal Newman was nght in his contention that 
the pursuit of civilization is not enough, it would seem to make ap-
• lb. p. 638. 
•Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius, by John N. Figgis, p. 88.-
"0n this subject we are supplied with noble arguments from the divine oracles, which 
inform us, that God himself, who can be limited by no established rules of law, would 
act contrary to his own nature, if he did not perform his promises. From whence 1t 
follows that the obligations to perform promises spring from the nature of that un· 
changeable justice, which is an attribute of God, and common to all who bear his 
image, in the use of reason." "The Rights of War and Peace," translated from the 
original Latin of Grotius by A. C. Campbell, University Classics Library, p. 134• 
•The Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U. S. u. 
• Report of Frederic C. Walcott of the Rockefeller Foundation, Nat. Geographic 
Mag., June, 1917. 
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plicable to the philosophers and literati of twentieth century Ger-
many the words written in 1796 by Burke of the political philos-
ophers of the Frenc;h Revolution: 
"Never before this time, was a set of literary men converted into 
a gang of robbers and assassins. Never before did a den of bravos 
and banditti assume the garb and tone of an academy of philos• 
ophers."9 • 
Would that he could have truly prophesied that this hideous mas-
querade should never again offend· our ey ..:s 1. 
'1.'hese three different views of the fundamentals of international 
law .. different as they are, all assume or assert the sovereignty of the 
state. But a system of law cannot be built upon the theory that 
those affected by the law are completely sovereign, for to the extent 
that the law does compel them, they cease to be absolutely sovereign. 
The only possible path to a richer field of international law leads 
through the broken wall of complete sovereignty. 
During the middle ages, the theory prevailed that the world was 
one, as controlled either by the Roman Empire or by the Christian 
Church, and international relations were hardly apprehended. With 
the growth of the great powers, however, came the necessity for 
some rules to regulate their relations, and international law grad-
ually grew up under the dominion of strong, national feeling, a feel-
ing which was in part the cause, and in part the effect, of the nat-
ional development. · 
A moment's reflection will explain the strength of this group feel-
ing. The bees and the ants have their community life, which they 
preserve by co-operation. So far as we know, the power that fits 
the individual bee or ant into his community life is instinct. Per-
haps the greatest in the series of steps of evolution was the birth of 
self-consciousness which made the individual realize himself as an 
individual and led him to ratiocinate on his relations to his commun-
ity. Man ·differs from the ant perhaps more in this than in shape 
or size. Among primitive men, the struggle for existence, the com-
petition for food and other necessities of life, arrayed each group 
in antagonism to every other. Only that group could survive which 
was coherent, and cohesion could only exist as each member was 
devoted to the other members of his own group and loyal to the 
whole. Within the primitive group there was in some measure dis-
cipline, law, order and peace, and without there was war. By this 
very arrangement of primitive society, war and peace interacted 
on each other, the existence of war outside the group making neces-
•A Letter to a Noble Lord. 
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sary peace within and peace within fitting it to protect itself against 
war from without.10 When two hostile clans or tribes of primitive 
men fought for the possession of a good hunting-ground, there was 
only the question of which of two groups of equally worthy or 
worthless men should have more food, though all of the men en-
gaged doubtless felt themselves to be patriots and entitled to the 
plaudits of their fellows. Patriotism, as a conscious emotion, orig-
inated, therefore, in the instinct of self-preservation or of group-
preservation. It was a biological necessity and therefore a moral 
virtue. And this primitive biological necessity or virtue has had 
incalculable potency in the development of our modem states and 
the formation of the rules which have been accepted as regulating 
the relations between them. It has availed in the past, under many 
pretexts of right, sometimes to instigate to aggression, in order 
that the group might be strengthened in territory or power, and 
again it has armed the hand for defense to protect that which the 
group already had. Whenever contests of force arise between 
groups, be they small clans or tribes or great nations, this instinctive 
patriotism revives and motivates the great mass of men who respond 
quickly to primitive emotions. 
Nationalities, however, dearly as we cherish them, are, after all, 
but instrumentalities of human progress. The instinctive patriot-
ism which commands not only unwavering but enthusiastic devotion 
of each man to his own country, has its biological and historical jus-
tification in the creation of these great instrumentalities. But do 
not a wider vision and a profounder insight into the destinies of 
man on earth and a deeper sympathy with the purposes of social 
order lead to the conclusion that without the destruction of national 
existence, there shall grow up between civilized nations a far strong-
er bond than has heretofore existed? Has not primitive patriotism 
evolved among educated men from an unreasoning instinct as an 
aid in preserving the group to an intellectual and moral devotion to 
ideals of government-national and international? Most of the 
Americans living today have never had occasion to feel the patriot-
ism which arouses them to defend their country and far less have 
they felt the patriotism that drives to aggression. Within.the mem-
ory of most of the present generation, there has been only the opera 
bouffe war with Spain in 1898, which only for a moment gave a 
tingle to our natipnal nerves. And yet we are not wanting in pa-
triotism, a patriotism, I believe, of a higher kind. Even the immi-
grant, newly come to our shores, feels a devotion, which he would 
10 Cf. Folkways, by W. G. Sumner, §§ 13·20. 
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himself be at a loss to explain, to the institutions of freedom whose 
shelter he has sought. We read our Declaration of Independence 
with its outworn eighteenth century philosophy and thrill and thrill 
again with love of our country, conceived in such noble resolve, and 
we repeat the pregnant phrases of our bills of right and glory that 
we are citizens of a country dedicated to liberty. Our emotional 
response, too, finds its confirmation in our sober moments of reason. 
We may be persuaded that the eighteenth century doctrine of nat-
ural rights, which inspired our forefathers and has guided much of 
our constitutional development, has no foundation in reason, but so 
also are we persuaded that pragmatically tested, the doctrine of in- . 
dividual liberty, however suspicious may have been its source, has 
worked. and we believe that while man remains at once a lazy ani-
mal, requiring incentive to labor, and also a liberty-loving spirit 
scorning servitude, it will continue to work. It was an expansion 
of this higher and nobler spirit of patriotism into the international 
field which, I surmise, induced the five United States members of 
the American Institute of International Law to give their adherence 
to the six propositions which I first read. This patriotism is some-
thing more than historical or biological. It has a moral or spiritual 
content. It does not assert that Americans are better than other 
people. It does not assert that American institutions must be im-
posed upon other people. It does not assert that America must 
declare the norms of international law and enforce observance there-
of. No, our patriotism is neither vainglorious nor selfish. The 
priceless boon of liberty which our hearts desire and our intellects 
approve we want not only for ourselves-we should rejoice to see 
it the. heritage of every man in every land. Ours is a devotion to 
an ideal! 
By this I do not mean that we Americans are superior to other 
people in having a higher form of patriotism. If we were attacked 
in such a way that our people were persuaded that their lands would 
be devastated, their h9mes destroyed, their wives and children mur-
dered and that a conqueror would, at the close of war, dominate our 
country so that as a native walked the street, .he would have to 
salute a foreign officer at each comer, we should feel the same sav-
age patriotism which today fills the breast of every Belgian and 
Frenchman. I am talking now rather of this sentiment of patriot-
ism in the American mind in times of peace. But if our patriotism 
be indeed a loyalty to a political ideal, if it be not only free from 
envy but instinct with charity, it should prompt in us the hope that 
the country we so love shall lead in the march toward international 
ideals. 
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It is not necessary now to discuss differences between scholars as 
to the bases of international law; suffice it to note that recognized 
rules have grown up as customary law, supplemented by specific 
agreements and treaties; and, as has been suggested, to the extent 
that the customs have prevailed between equals, they are evidence of 
agreements, so, it may be said, all international law is founded in 
agreement. Most questions between nations are discussed as ques-
tions arising between individuals and governed by rules analogous 
to those of municipal law. Because there has been no superstate to 
enforce law, or against which offenses could be committed, all the 
analogies have been those of civil law and there has been no such 
thing as international criminal law. A state can have a claim against 
another state or a national of one state can have a claim against an-
other state and these claims may sound in contract or it tort, but 
no state can be indicted or convicted for a felony or misdemeanor. 
The suggestion I wish to leave with you today is that this is in 
process of change and the entrance of the United States into the 
present great war on the side of Great Britain and her allies may be 
the unconscious beginning of an international criminal law.11 Bear 
in mind that systems of jurisprudence grow up out of custom, be-
ginning in a single act done, ordinarily, in entire unconsciousness by 
the actor that he is determining future law. In discussing questions 
of international law, we are, perforce, driven to analogy, but we 
must use analogies always conscious of their danger. The Declara-
tion of the American Institute of International Law has been criti-
cized by careful students as failing to observe this caution and press-
ing too close the analogy between states and private persons.12 Prob-
ably many fallacies have their origin in this analogy. Perhaps a closer 
analogy is to be found in the relations of corporations, but a still 
closer one is to be found in societies in which there are local groups 
of more or less coherenct!, joined together in a loose organization; 
and perhaps the best known example of such an organization is to 
be found in the history of early England. 
Up to the time of Edward I. at least, the organization under the 
king was loose. There were hundreds, towns, lords of the manor-
different groups, in a large measure independent of each other and 
owing varying degrees of allegiance to the king. For instance, the 
conclusion of the ordinary indictment "against the peace and dig-
nity of our lord, the king," was originally no idle form, but a juris-
11 Opening Address of Elihu Root, Pres't Am. Soc. Int. Law, Dec. 28, 1915; 10 Am. 
Jour Int. Law, 1, 7-9. 
22 The Analogy between Natural Persons and International Persons in the Law of 
Nations, by Edwin DeWitt Dickinson, XXVI Yale L. Jour. 564. 
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dictional averment which must be proved. The king's peace did 
not extend to all parts of the realm nor equally to all people, nor did 
it prevail at all times. One man might be within tpe king's peace 
and an assault upon him was "against the peace and dignity of our 
lord, the king," while a similar assault upon another man at the 
same time and place might not be a violation of the king's peace. ·So 
our common expression, "the king's highway,'' originated in the 
days in England when there were four highways within the king's 
peace, so that an assault committed upon a traveler on one of them 
was against the peace of the king, while an assault committed one 
hundred yards away was not.13 
I am not unmindful that there is a distinction between federal law 
and int~rnational law and to the extent that law becomes federal it 
may be said to cease to be international.14 And yet analogies be-
tween federal and international law, or between the rules governing 
groups in a loose organization and those in international law, are 
illuminating. In this early society in England, violence was com-
mon; homicides and robbery were everyday occurrences. The cen-
tral authority was hopelessly inadequate for the security of the 
individual and the stranger had little or no protection from the 
members of the community in which he was attacked. The man 
who traveled, therefore, from one part of England to another, took 
his life in his hands. To remedy this, the central authorities sought 
to impose financial liability upon the hundred or the county which 
suffered an offense without apprehending aJ?.d punishing the felon, 
and the rule grew up, known as the "hue and cry." Under this rule, 
which probably existed at first by virtue of custom and was after-
wards incorporated in statute, if one were assaulted, he could seek 
out a constable, whose duty it was then to raise a hue and cry, and 
it was the duty of all within hearing to join with the constable in-
the pursuit of the felon. Not only this, if the victim could not locate 
a constable, he could himself raise a hue and cry and it was equally 
the duty of those within hearing to respond to his call and join with 
him in the pursuit of the felon, and if one did not respond to the 
call and do his duty in helping to apprehend the culprit he was him-
self punishable, nor was he liable for manslaughter or murder for 
killing a resisting offender.15 
1! The King's Peace, O"ford Lectures and Other Discourses, by Sir Frederick Pol·. 
lock (Macmillan, 1890) p. 65. 
:u Elements of Jurisprudence, T. E. Holland, p. 333. 
15 :z Hale's Pleas of the Crown (1st Am. Ed.), Chap. XII; Reeves Hist. of Eng. Law 
(Finlason's Ed.), p. 121; :z Pollock & Maitland Hist. of Eng. Law, 578, 606; 4 Black-
stone's Com. *p. 293; Stubbs, Select Charters (:znd Ed.),. 4.26 et seq., 469; I Stephen's 
Hist. of Crim. L. 188. 
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Here is an important step in the early evolution of criminal law. 
It was recognized that an assault was an offense not only against the 
man assaulted, but against the state, and though the state was itself 
not sufficiently powerful to control the criminals or to apprehend 
them after an offense had been committed, it was made the duty of 
the constituent parts of the state, the citizens, at their own risk and 
cost, to discharge what \Ve now regard as a function of the state, 
and to pursue and apprehend and, if necessary, kill the offender. 
All law, save as it may include formal regulations of convenience, 
such as the law of the road, has a moral element. Arising from 
custom and agreement, it embodies that which is generally accepted 
to be right. Nations, in the sense that they are governed by inter-
national law, are juristic persons, and one may not be a juristic per-
son and free from moral responsibility. International law, like 
municipal law, embodies and expresses that which is generally ac-
cepted to be right. The international community is just as much 
interested in preserving law and order as is a domestic community, 
and a violation of international order, of such a flagrant character 
as to constitute not only a wrong against another international per-
son, but also an offense against the very stability of the international 
order, if it technically cannot be called an international crime, should 
arouse, in right-thinking people, the same sense of horror and indig-
nation as are stirred by acts which constitute crime under municipal 
law, and to the extent that international society is equipped to cope 
with it, it should be treated as crime. I am not aware that history 
affords any instance of all other nations or any considerabl~ part of 
other nations co-operating in punishing one nation as a criminal, but 
it will be recalled that when the commander of the American man-
of-war removed from the Trent, a British vessel, Messrs. Mason 
and Slidell, the Confederate commissioners who were on their way 
to England, there was an immediate protest not only from England, 
but also from Prussia, Austria and France, and these protests were 
not without the suggestion that unless the United States abandoned 
the right of search so asserted, war might ensue.16 Here, then, was 
the declaration by three great powers that an act which did not affect 
them directly might be so dangerous as a precedent that they were 
justified in protesting and even threatening. As each individual of 
a nation is vitally interested in the preservation of law within his 
own country, so every nation is vitally interested in the preservation 
of those rules of international law which make for international 
:ia Opening Address of Elihu Root, President of Am. Soc. of Int. Law, April 27, 
1916, X Am. Jour. of Int. Law, 217·219. 
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safety, and just as in primitive England, because the central power 
was weak, the individuals were bound in law to join together in an 
effort to apprehend a felon, so, I submit, civilized nations are bound 
in law,-as it \Vill be if it is not so now-to join together to arrest 
an international criminal. And the fact that the particular offender 
is not only a criminal, but an insane ~riminal, does not alter the role. 
The people of this country saw this present great war begin and 
were under no delusion as to its causes. They knew that Austria 
niade a demand upon Serbia to which no self-respecting nation could 
yield. They knew that the demand made by Austria was backed 
by Germany. They knew that Germany declined the reasonable re-
quest of England for a few days' delay. They knew that Germany, 
in violation of a treaty to which this country was itself a signatory, 17 
invaded the territory of poor Belgium, not a party to the quarrel, 
and presumably safe within the shelter promised by Germany her7 
self.18 As the war proceeded, we witnessed the occupation of Bel-
gium's territory, the murder of her women and children, the enslave-
ment of her men, the wholesale destruction by starvation of peace-
ful peasants in Poland, the bloody massacres of unoffending Ar-
menians and the sinking upon the high seas of neutral merchantmen 
with their innocent passengers and crews, in violation of common 
decency and of every accepted rule; and still we were not moved 
to action. With few exceptions and with extraordinary moral ob-
tuseness, our people witnessed these world outrages with indiffer-
ence. Because we were not attacked on our own soil, our primitive 
patriotism was not aroused. When the Lusitania was sunk, and a 
thousand or more non-combatants, including helpless women and . 
little children, went to their watery graves, indignation was stirred 
an~ more people began to feel that this country was or should be ' 
interested, but still the passion of the country was not inflamed. Not 
until there was disclosed Germany's plot to combine with Mexico 
and Japan and attack us upon our own territory, not until Germany 
at the same time announced her intention to resume her ruthless 
submarine policy, did the President feel that the sentiment of the 
country was sufficiently awakened to justify him in recommending 
to Congress that it recognize a state of war. In his appeal of April 
second, however, magnificent address though it is, he stresses par-
ticularly the wrongs to our own country and the threat to demo-
11 Convention V, Second Hague Conference; but see Ed. note, IX American Journal 
of International Law, 959. 
1STreaty of January 23, 1839, between England, Austria, Russia and Prussia. See 
Some Questions of International Law in the European \Var, by James W. Garner; IX 
American Journal of International Law, 72. 
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cratic institutions. If ever a country had been patient, almost to the 
point of cowardice, in endurance of wrongs and repeated wro~gs, 
of outrage upon outrage, ours is that country. These offenses 
against us were not only adequate, they were compelling, causes of 
war-but I could wish that the consciences of our people had been 
sufficiently sensitive so that they would have reacted to the higher 
motive of national duty. 
From nothing I have said would I have it inferred that I have in 
mind any criticism of our President or his administration. If I 
have felt that the outrages perpetrated by Germany and the philos-
ophy we know is back of them, have proved her an international, 
insane criminal, I have also realized that he upon whose shoulders 
has rested the grave responsibility of guiding our people, could act 
in this great crisis only as he was assured that the conscience and 
judgment of the American people were behind him, and with regret 
and shame I confess to the belief that there has been no overwhelm-
ing moral earnestness in our people which has demanded of their 
Government that it should join the international hue and cry. The 
tragic offense has been too far away; imaginations are not suffi-
ciently vivid; perhaps, indeed, consciences have not been highly 
enough sensitized. With advancing civilization and a greater em-
phasis upon, and consequent familiarity with, questions of inter-
national relations, however, I believe that the .Atµerican people will, 
in time, come to realize that they and all peoples who desire justice 
are and must be deeply concerned in the prevention of international 
crime and the punishment of international criminals. 
The League to Enforce Peace is seeking to arouse public opinion 
so that at the close of this war a treaty shall be made under which 
all civilized powers shall agree that all disputes shall be submitted, 
those that are justiciable to a court for decision, and those that are 
not justiciable, to a Commission of Conciliation, and that the joint 
military and naval forces of the signatories shall be used against any 
power which goes to war before submitting such controversy. The 
plan has the approval of many of our most thoughtful students of 
international law and of many of our leading men in public life, 
and has received the endorsement of President Wilson. If adopt-
ed, it would, in effect, incorporate in treaty the suggestion I now 
make, to the extent, at least, of declaring that an act of war, before 
submitting the cause of war to arbitrament, would bring upon the 
offender's head the wrath of all other signatory powers. Such a 
treaty would be declaratory of what I suggest should be recognized 
as international law and of what, I believe, our own country, by its 
entrance into the war, has already subconsciously recognized as in-
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ternational law. America has gone into this war not only because 
her citizens have been killed on the high seas, not only because her 
ships have been sunk, not only because Germany has maintained a 
spy-system within our borders 911d has plotted for an attack by our 
southern neighbor, but also, in the words of our President, because 
"the world must be made safe for d~mocracy," and by that phrase, 
I take it, he means that there is a moral purpose in our people which 
feels itself in danger of defeat so long as a powerful nation is per-
mitted to commit national murder with impunity. And he intends 
to say, further, that the American people are in this war not only 
for the defense of their own rights, but in the defense of funda-
mental and eternal righteousness for all peoples and for all time. 
Russia,.in backing up Serbia, may have been actuated to some extent 
by purely nationalistic ambitions; France, in joining Russia, may 
have been moved in some degree by the requirements of treaties ; 
England, in entering the war, may have been guided, in part, by the 
belief that prudence required that Germany be kept from occupying 
the coast of France and Belgium, but millions of the right-thinking 
citizens of these countries felt, too, that they were bound to endure 
war not only for their own national interests, but that it might be 
established for all time and for all men that Austria could not, at 
will, crush her smaller neighbor, nor Germany, at will, trample the 
Belgian people into the dust. With our country, now one of the 
Allies, national ambitions are pushed to the background, and the war 
must proceed for the great moral p~rpose of making it impossible 
for this particular offender, at least, ever again to flout the ordinary 
decencies. Organized piracy was once driven from the seas by the 
co-operation of civilized powers. Brigandage on land should fare 
no better. 
But there are those who cry aloud, "Tell us what terms of peace 
you will make? Tell us what you hope to accomplish?" The man 
who stops a huntsman as he raises his gun to shoot at a flying duck 
to inquire how he intends to cook the duck when he has shot it, is a 
fool. The man who stops the patrol wagon to ask the policemen 
what punishment they are going to inflict upon the rioters whom 
they are galloping to arrest is worse than a fool-he is an accessory 
after the fact. The constabulary of the civilized world is now en-
gaged in catching an insane criminal and it will be time enough to 
ask what shall be done with him after he has been. disarmed and 
manacled. Terms of settlement- of a civil action may be discussed, 
but neither a righteous man nor a righteous nation can compound 
a felony. 
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As we are gathered here discussing these questions so profoundly 
interesting to us, all over our broad land strains of martial music 
are quickening the pulse beats of our country's youth. Young men 
who almost until today looked forward to normal lives of quiet 
professional or business pursuits are already in khaki and scanning 
the first pages of their manual of arms. In another month hundreds 
of thousands of our best boys will be in training camps, and before 
many more months will be on the soil of France, or, perchance, of 
Russia. And then, my friends, will come the day of trial. We who 
stay behind, only, I hope, because we are unfitted by reason of age 
or other infirmity for military service, will scan the daily casualty 
list and our hearts will sicken as we learn of loved ones who have 
gone to unmarked graves. But as the glaµ10ur of war and the ex-
hilaration of military bands do not now rob of clear vision those 
whose convictions are founded in sound and sober thought, so the 
day of grief will not avail either to enlarge or to lessen the righteous 
indignation of him who loves right because it is right, nor to stay 
the flaming sword in the sure, strong hand of Justice. And when 
the war is over, be our losses what they may, be our grief more 
even then we fear, rest assured that if there has been born into the 
world the living principle that a nation stands not only in relations 
to each of the other nations, but in relations to the whole, and 
that out of that relationship there arises a moral and legal duty to 
refrain from crime, and that that duty is one which all are bound to 
enforce-be assured, then, I say, that this awful war of untold hor-
ror will not have been fought in vain. 
CHARLES H. HAMILL.. 
Chicago. 
